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STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND CREDIT DELIVERY
TO SMEs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
By

Ubadigbo Okonkwo*

hrough the interaction of Soviet block, the former cent powerful forces. small and trally planned economies of
medium enterprises (SMEs) have Centraland Eastern Europe, and
I
ernerged as an important agent the Baltic countries, Russia and
of economic and socialtransfor- the other countries of the former
mation in all countries of the Soviet Llnion (BRO) have been
world. The promotion of SMEs grappling with difficult challenges
is no longer just the business of of political and economic reform.
the World Association for Small In the process of building marketand Medium Enterprises based economic systems, these
I]BADIGBO OKONI(WO
(WASME) and other non-gov- transition countries have faced
ernmental organisations (NGOs). problems of hyper-inflation, de- ciency. In some countries, SAP
It has become a major plank of clining incomes and high unem- has
contributed to
public policy in industrial and ployment. While each country macroeconomic stability. Howdeveloping countries alike.
has opted for a reform package ever, in most adjusting countries

I
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In industrial countries, recent
innovations in information technology, industrial deregulation
and global competition have
propelled the spread of small
business and forced large corporations to search for new
strategies to gain competitive
advantage. Corporate downsizing and demerging have become the new mantra of management gurus and business
leaders. Meanwhile, volatile private capital flows across countries. industrial restructuring and
rigidities in labour markets have
exacerbated the problem of
structural unemployment in
many industrial countries. Small
business is widely seen as a
panacea for unemployment and
economic recession. Giant corporations and Governments have
come to realise that "Small is
Beautiful"
Following the collapse of the

best suited to its unique economic

it was accompanied by a marked

and social characteristics, the decline in private investment and
elements of successful economic
reform have included the reduction of inflationary pressures the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the promotion of SMEs.
In developing countries SMEs
have remained the most dynamic
sector of the economy. The East

Asian Miracle was built on the
foundation of thriving SMEs. In
the wake of the external debt
crisis of the early 1980s, many
developing countries seeking
bilateral debt rescheduling were
forced to implement structural
adjustment programmes (SAP)
under the supervision of the

Bretton Woods institutions,
namely the International Monetary Fund (lMF) and the World
Bank. SAP was aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability
and increasing economic effi-

stagnation of the SME sector.

II. THE IMPACT OF
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ON SMES
l. A Definition of SME
"Small and medium enterprise (SME)i is a relative and
heterogeneQus concept. What is
smallin an industrialcountry like
the United States may not be

considered small in an African
country like Burkina Faso. What
is small in the manufacturing
sector may not be small in the
retailtrade sector. Moreover, no
common yardstick is internationally accepted for measuring
the size of enterprises. Quantitative indicators include the
number of employees, sales and
capital employed while qualitative indicators include legal status, ownership structure, factor
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intensity and technology.
For policy purposes, many
countries employ quantitative
indicators in defining SMEs. For
example, in Japan, SMEs are
classified into three different industrial categories and for each
category, aceiling isspecified on
the number of employees and
capital employed. For the mining and manufacturing industry,
SMEs are defined as having less
than 300 employees or lessthan
100 million Yen of capital employed. For the wholesale trade,
less than 100 employees or less
than 30 million Yen For retail
trade and service industries less
than 50 employees or less than
10 million Yen of capital emPloyed.ttt

2. The Role of SMEs in Developing Countries
SMEs are e'source of dynamism and growth in the process
of economic development. With
the recent trend invoiving rapid
changes in comrnodity prices,
international interest rates and
exchange rates, SMEs can adjust
better to external shocks than
large enterprises. SMEs can also
serve as a rich seedbed for the
growth of entrepreneurship.
SMEs tend to employ relatively more labour intensive
methods of production and can
therefore create jobs at low
capital cost while contributing to
poverty alleviation. SMEs promote industrial dispersal and the
efficient utilisation of local inputs
and foster strong industrial linkages and diffusion of technology
especially where tirey produce
for exports or sui-,ply inputs tc
large enterprises.
1?

In East Asia, Governments
have intervened in financial
markets to promote exports and
SMEs by providing bank credit
at subsidized rates of interest,
export financing and credit guarantee schemes. These support
schemes have been most successful in Taiwan where SMEs
have comprised over 90 per cent
of the total number of enterprises
in each sector of the economy
and accounted for 6O per cent of
the value of exports.(2) Notwithstanding the apparent domi-

The Federal Government has
also established many devel-

opment finance institutions
to provide term funds in local
and loreign currencies to
SMEs. More recently, two
apex credit delivery schemes
have been established to onlend foreign currency loans
to SMEs through a network of
participating commercial
banks and specialised linancial institutions.

of private sector conglomerates such as the
"Chaebol" in Korea and the
nance

specialised financial institutions,

technical and

business
consultancy companies and entrepreneurship development institutes for SMEs. In addition,
the Government has identified
and reserved for small scale industries the production of some
836 product items. Large scale
industries have been prohibited
from producing these items except for exports. Indian small
scale industries have accounted
for 40 per cent of manufacturing
value added and 30 per cent of
total value of export5.{s)
In Africa, Governments have
provided financial incentives to
SMEs by establishing agricultural

and industrial development financial institutions (DFIs) and
directed-credit programmes. In
Nigeria, for example, licensed
commercial and merchant banks
are required in 1995 to allocate
a minimum of 20 per cent of
their totaloutstanding loans and
advance to small-scale industries
and to lend to ruralborrowers at
least 50 per cent of deposits
mobilised in rural communities.
The Federal Governrnent has
also established many development finance institutions to
provide term funds in local and
foreign currencies to SMEs. More
recently, two apex credit delivery
schemes have been established
to on-lend foreign currency loans
to SMEs through a network of
participating commercial banks
and specialised financial institutions.

"Keiretsu" in Japan, SMEs in
Korea stillaccounted for 51 per
cent of manufacturing employment and 35 per cent manufacturing value added in 198B while
in Japan they accounted f.or 52
per cent of both manufacturing
value added and sales and over
40 per cent of manufacturing
3. The Impact of SAP on
employment in 1989.
In South Asia, India has es- Private Investment and
tablished a tradition of institu- SMEs
Under the aegis of the Bretton
tional support for SMEs. The
Government has set up Woods institutions, many devel-
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oping countries have adopted ods with severe adverse effects nance commercially viable
structural adjustment pro- on economic growth. As Gov- projects in the productive secgrammes (SAP)in the aftermath
of the external debt crisis. In
general, SAP prescribed the depreciation of the real exchange
to improve the balance of payments restrictive fiscal and
monetary policies to curb infla-

tionary pressures and the
libralisation of trade and financial
reform policies to enhance the
efficiency and growth of the real
sector of the economy.
Financial sector reform was
implemented as a major component of SAP and included the
rationalisation of interest rates,
the abolition of directed credit
programmes and interest rate
subsidies for SMEs and other
priority sectors, the strengthening of the accounting and legal

framework. the revamping of
the structure of prudentialregulation and supervision, the
privatisation of financial institutions and the relaxation of entry
restrictions.
The World Bank has recently
reviewed some 99 structuraland
sectoral adjustment loan opera-

ernments undertook little investment during the adjustment period and SMEs comprised well
over 90 percent of allenterprises.
it can be argued that SAP adversely affected private sector
investment and the growth o{
SMEs especially in Sub-saharan
Africa.
Several factors contributed
to this worrisome development.
Firstly, SAP was based on a free
market neo-classical model of
capitalist development that has
proved quite wrong for many

developing countries where
property rights are ill-defined,
private contracts are poorly enforced, financial and physical
infrastrutures are inadequate and
financial markets are incomplete
Indeed, financial markets in both
developed and developing coun-

tries are often riddled with
problems of externalities. im
perfect information, moral hazard and adverse selection which
tend to reduce allocative effi
ciency of free market>."i) Developing countriesshould learrr from

tors of the economy. In the preadjustment period. a few developing countries did not adhere

to this principle of
behaviour.

prudent

In sorne of

these

countries, the Government and
State-owned enterprises i ndulged
in reckless borrowing from accommodating foreign banks and
squandered the proceeds on
wasteful public consumption, illconceived projects and capital
flight. As a necessary correction,
SAP should have stopped at

recommending appropriate
policies for domestic resource
mobilisation and prudent lending.
However, by calling for the
scrapping of incentive schemes
for SMEs in the name of financial reform, SAP r,rras in effect
throwing out the baby with the
bath-water.
Thirdly. several developing
countries experienced political
instability, natural and environmental disasters, and lack of

transparent and participatory
leadership which contributed to
frequent policy reversal and retions in 42 countries that the successfulexperience of East duced the flow of private investimplemented adjustment Asian countries whlch followed nrent by both local and foreign
programmes.(a) The majority of a different model of economic investors.
countries that reduced their fis- development based on effective
Fourthly. even f or developing
partnership
governcal deficit and depreciated the
between
countries that stayed the course
realexchange rate obtained the ment and the private sector, rapid in implernerrting SAP, external
desired improvement in accumulation of human and credrtors rarely honoured their
macroeconomic stabilisation. physical capital and State inter- pledges of rre''"v financing. IrrterHoweverin 27 of the42 adjusting vention in capital marl<ets to national comrnercial banks rrrade
countries. mostly in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America. the
investment-GDP ratio fell dr-rri ng
the adjustment period P6r Qr 1[Saharan Africa. the investmentGDP ratio fellduring the adjustment and post-adjustment periIS

foster the growth of exports and
SMEs.
Secondly. where developing
countries are unable to rnobilise
adequate domestic saving. there
is a bona fide case for obtaining
additional foreign saving to fi-

provisions for their bad sovereign
loans and cui off nerv financrrg
t o all developing countries except
for the very creditworthy. Ever
eager to maintain their high credit
rating. multilateral creditors rejected all quests for debt relief
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while bilateral creditors insisted
on the adoption of SAP as a
condition for granting debt rescheduling.

Finally, SAP was often
implemented with inappropriate
timing and sequencing of policies. Many developing countries

were forced

to adopt trade

libralisation and financial reform
before the stabilisation of the

macroeconomic framework.
Other things being equal, trade
libralisation can improve economic efficiency by creacting a
level playing field for domestic
and foreign firms. However,
other things are never equal as
foreign firms are generally established firms with global production and export marketing
facilities operating in low-inflation
countries while firms in develop-

ing countries are under-

capitalised SMEs with deficient
technological and managerial
resources operating in high inflation countries. With these
sharp differences and inequalities, developing countries can
catch up with the industrial
countries not byadopting instant
trade libralisation but by rapidly
accumulating human and physical capital, maintaining political
and macroeconomic stability and
providing other incentives to
promote local and foreign private
investment. Similarly, financial

deregulation

without

macroeconomic stability is likely
to be counter-productive.

III. External Financing Flows
to Developlng Countrles
With the United States Government running a large current
account deficit and other indus-

la

is undertaken by transnational
corporations in search of global
production, sourcing and marketing strategies, SMEs in creditworthy countries can attract FDI
through equity jointventures and
licensing agreements.
In recent years, portfolio equity flows have been the most
rapidly growing component of
private capitaland have increased
more than thirteen fold from
us$3.5 billion in 1989 to
US$47 billion in 1993. The surge
in portfolio equity flows has reflected largely the growth of direct equity purchases by foreigners in emerging stock markets
1. The Ascendency of Pri- following the removalof restrictions on foreign ownership,
vate Capital Flows
private
Total
capital flows liberalised capital account transacross countries and regions have actions, improved accounting
increased sharply in size and pace and information standards and
in recent years.(6) As a share of large privatisations. As compared
total external financing, private with FDI, portfolio investment is
capital flows declined from 61 relatively more volatile reflecting
per cent irr 1980 to 50 per cent political and economic developin 1989 and then rose sharplyto ments in developing countries,
75 percent in 1993. (Table 1). changes in international interest
The ascendency of private rates and the investment
capital flows has reflected the behaviour of fund rmanagers in
growth of equity investment industrial countries. The sharp
which surged from 6 per cent of
total external financing in 1980 The surge in portfolio equity
to 53 per cent in 1993. Foreign flows has reflected largelythe
direct investment (FDI) more growth.of dlrect equity purthan doubledfrom US$26 billion
in 7989 to US$67 billion in chases by foreigners in
7993. For the host country, FDI emerging stock markets folis the least risky and volatile lowing the removal of restriccomponent of private capital tions
on loreign ownership,
flows. FDI is non-interest bearing and allows for more risk liberalised capital hccount
sharing between the foreign in- transactions, improved ac.
vestor and the host country. It counting and information
also facilitates the transfer of
standards
large
technology and management
practices. While the bulk of FDI privatisations.
trial countries beset with budgetary problems, the supply of foreign saving from official bilateral
and multilateral sources is likely
to remain scarce in the medium
term. In these circumstances only
creditworthy middle-income developing countries with a proven
track record of non-inflationary
growth can expect to attract
external financing from private
capital markets. The heavily indebted low-income countries
have little prospects of attracting
externalfinancing and must rely
largely on their domestic financial systems to mobilise resources
for investment.

and
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drop in capital inflows to Mexico
following the peso devaluation
in December 1994 has cast serous doubt on the sustainability
and stability of portfolio investment flows in developing countries.

The major components of
private capital flows have been
concentrated in a few creditworthy middle-income countries.
In 1989-93, more than half of
portfolio equity flows went to
three countries, namely Brazil,
Mexico and the Republic of Korea. Five countries (Argentina,
China, Malaysia, Mexico and
Thailand) accounted for more
than half of totalFDI flows to all
developing countries in 198993 while only three countries
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico)
accounted for about 40 per cent
of long-term bond financing
flows.
2. Ttre Plight of the Heavily

Indebted Low-Income

July/September 1995

East Asia attracted US$63 billion representing 40 per cent of
total private capitalflows. In the
absence of a concerted international action on debt relief, the

heavily indebted low-income
countries will remain trapped in
a vicious circle of external debt
overhang, low investrnent and
declining per capita income.
Recently, the World Bank has
proposed the establishment of a
US$11 billion Multilateral Debt
Facility (MDF) to pay the maturing
principal and interest payments
on multilateral loans on behalf of

low-income debtor countries.(7)
ln 1994, the forty heavily indebted low-income countries
owed a totalof US$30.5 billion
to multilateral creditors including

the International Development
Association (lDA), International
Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (lMF) and
African Developrnent Bank
(ADB). Access to MDF would be

Countries
With virtually no access to conditional on the eligible
private capitalflows, the heavily countries establishing a proven
indebted low-income countries record of performance on ecohave faced dire prospects of nomic reform and entering prior
declining investment and eco- agreement on debt stock reducnomic stagnation. These countries are concentrated in Subsaharan Africa and depend
largely on international handouts and concessionary loans as

their main source of external
financing.

In 1993, the ratio of total
external debt stock as a per cent
of gross national product averaged 73 per cent for Sub-saharan
Africa compared with only 32
per cent for East Asia. (Table 2).
In the same year, no net private
capital went to Africa whereas
I5

However a sound and diversified
financial systern can facilitate the
process of industrial investment
and economic growth. As unregulated and competitive financial markets tend to generate
economic instability and inefficiency, governments in all
countries have intervened actively in financial markets to promote economic welfare and direct credit to priority sectors such
as SMEs.
A necessary condition for ef-

fective financial intermediation

is the maintenance

of

macroeconomic stability. High
and volatile inflation discourages

financial saving while large fiscal
deficits and heavy external indebtedness hamper private investment an economic growth.
Appropriate fiscal, monetary and
exchange rate policies can contribute to macroeconomic stability. Fiscal policy should aim at
achieving a sustainable fiscal
balance. Tax policy should focus

on introducing

broad-based
consumption taxes, improving
tax administration and providing
incentives for household saving
and private investment. Public
tion with international commer- expenditure priorities should incial bank and bilateral creditors. clude primary heath care, eduAlthough the multilateral credi- cation, economic infrastructure
tors are yet to agree on the and the rationalisation and
funding and operation of the privatisation of State-owned enMDF, the World Bank has taken terprises. Furthermore, the fia bold and commendable initia- nancing of the fiscaldeficit should
in resolving the external debt avoid excessive borrowing from
problem of the heavily indebted the Central Bank which can
low-income countries.
contribute to inflationary pressures.

lV. Domestic Credit Delivery
to SMEs
It is often said that finance is
the handmaiden of commerce.

Monetary policy should be
consistent with fiscal policy and
should aim at protecting the value

of the currency. Statutory limits
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Credit and interest rate

high risk of default because SMEs
are said to lack a track record.

guidelines can undermine are unable to maintain timely
accurate financial accounts
the financial position of and
and are more vulnerable to
if

thespread between
market and economic changes.
deposit and lending inter- Secondly. the administrative cost
est rates is insufficient to of processing small loans is concover the cost of loan pro- sidered so prohibitive in relation
,cessing and default.
to income that banks rnay prefer
banks

should be placed on centralbank
credit to Government and open
market operations should be used
for the control of money supply.
The implementation of monetary
policy should be anchored on an

fndependent Central Bank with
sufficient autonomy and expertise to design and implement
appropriate credit and exchange
rate policies whiie maintaining
the soundness of the financial
system through elfective prudential regulation and supervision.

1. Credit Delivery through
Deposit Money Banks
Deposit money banks such

as commercial banks hold

a
all financial as-

greater share of
sets in developiirg courrtries (48
percent)than they do in industrial
countries (37 percent).'8)ln most
developi ng countries these ban ks
specialise in self-liquidating trade
finance with the bulk of their
loans and advances maturing
within 12 months. Most commercial banks do not offer medium to long-term de1..'osit facilities and have ncl buiit up the
required expertise [r.rr appraising
and monitoring term loans.
Furthermore. commercial
banks are relucta.'- to lend to
SMEs for various reasons. Firstly,

to SMEs tends to carry a

l6

not to book such loans. Thirdly,
banks usually demand asset collateral as a device to reduce the
risk of non-payment but SMEs
are unable to provide such collateral.

To ensure that credit is
available to SMEs at reasonable
cost. governments in many developing countries have directed
commercial banks to allocate a
specified minimum proportion
of their loans and advances to
SMEs at subsidised interest rates.
Credit and interest rate guidelines
can undermine the financial position of banks if the spread between deposit and lending interest rates is insufficient to cover
the cost of loan processing and
default. Moreover, in some
countries, subsidised loans did
not always get to the intended
beneficiaries. However, rather
than scrapping the credit guidelines as prescribed by SAP, the
central banks should monitor the
structure of interest rates to ensr-rre that the banks received adequate interest rate spreads to
cover both the cost of loan default
and processing. To free SMEs
from the demand for collaterals,
many developed and developing
countries have established credit
guarantee schemes for SMEs
which have operated

success-

fully in some countries.(!))

2. Developing Finance Institutions (DFIs)
The lack of equity capitaland
long-term debt has been a major
lacuna in the financialsystem of

developing countries. Notwithstanding the growth in the
number of emerging capital
markets in recent years capital
markets in developing countries
are still characterised by weak

regulatory and tax systems.
cumbersome and costly listing
requirements, thin trading and
volatile price movements. Admittedly. commercial banks
usually rollover short-term overdraft facilities on maturitv. but
this is a poor substitute for longterm debt.
To fill the gap in long-term
financing. many developing
countries have established development finance institutions
(DFIs) to direct credit to SMEs
from resources provided by home

Governments and external
creditors. Although DFIs have
largely succeeded in mobilising
term finance for SMEs. in recent
years many industrial and agriculturalDFls have been plagr-red
by deteriorating loan portfolios,
poor financial performance.
technical insolvency and bankruptcy.
Many factors have contributed to this predicament. Firstly,
DFIs has operated in a niche
market providing term finance
to SMEs in foreign currency at
subsidised interest rates and
overvalued exchange rates.
However, this protected market
has been eroded by financial
deregulation, the withdrawal of
external financing, the abolition
of directed credit programmes
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and interest rate subsidies and
rapid depreciation of the exchange rate in circumstances
where the SME clients could
neither bear nor hedge the resulting foreign exchange risk.
These developments have worsened the arrears problem in the
loan portfolio of DFIs and reduced their profit margins. Secondly, many industrial DFIs did

not take deposits. or provide
working capital finance and other
current services and hence lacked
up-to-date information on their
clients to monitor and control

instruments such as equipment
leasing and venture capitalcompanies. Moreover, as SMEs are
generally unable to bear the risk
of foreign exchange fluctuations,
DFIs should only continue to onlend foreign currency resources
to SMEs where the foreign exchange risk is borne by Government. Furthermore, DFIs should
accord high priority to domestic
resource mobilisation including
deposit taking and the issuance
of government guaranteed debenture stock. While insolvent
DFIs willneed to be recapitalised
and their bad loans foreclosed,

credit risk and ensure prompt
loan repayment. Moreover, the lending policies of DFIs should
specialisation in medium and be strengthened and only trained
long-term lending to SMEs ex- and competent professionals
posed DFIs to interest rate risk should be appointed to the top
and business cycle fluctuations.

Thirdly, many governmentowned DFIs suffered from undue
interference in the selection and
processing of loans and in the
recruitment, promotion and remuneration of boards of directors and top management.
DFIs may constitute an endangered species but their rate

should not be condemned to
extinction or benign neglect.
Their role as a tested source o[
long-term finance for SMEs is
still hrghly relevant. Government

management and board of directors of the restructured DFIs. To
shield DFIs from undue political
interference. the prudential supervision of DFIs should be
transferred to the Central Bank
and government equity stake

should be reduced through
privatisation. When a DFI must
lend to commercially non-viable
projects or at the Government's
behest, such lending should be
undertaken through a managed
fund outside the DFI's operations.

should design and implement

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

effective restructuring plans for
DFIs following a critical review
of their operating environment
and management practices.
In response to the challenge
financial
of
deregulation. DFIs
should diversify their lending
operations to include working
capital financing and the provision of current services and
should expand their range of
services to other term-finance

17

V. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the external debt crisis of the early 1 980s,

many developing countries
adopted structural adjustment
programmes (SAP) under the
aegis of the Bretton Woods insti-

tutions. While it contributed to
the restoration of macro-economic stability, SAP was accompanied by declining private
investment and stagnation of the

SME sector in many adjusting
countries. SAP also called for
financial deregulation, the depreciation of the exchange rate
and the abolition of directed credit

programmes which reduced
many DFIs and their SME clients
to the brink of bankruptcy.
In this paper, an attempt was

made to analyse the impact of
SAP and related financial reform on SMEs. The experience
of East Asian economies has
shown that Governments can
intervene successfully in financialmarkets by creating financial
institutions and directing credit
in ways that promote both economic stability and growth. Other
developing countries can draw
usefullessons from the East Asian
Experience.
The paper has also focused
on the plight of the heavily indebted low-income countries that
are concentrated in Sub-saharan
Africa and have little access to
private capital flows. These
economies are condemned to
operate in a vicious circle of
external debt overhang and declining per capital incomes unless concerted international action is taken to reduce their externaldebt burden and a radical
restructuring of their domestic
financial systems and policies is
promptly implemented. In designing this financial restructuring plan, emphasis should be
placed on the maintenance of
political and macroeconomic
stability, the prudential supervision of financial institutions and
the resuscitation of development
finance institution with a mandate to mobilise resources and
direct credit to priority sectors
including SMEs and manufactured exports.
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Table I
Aggregate Net Long-Term Resources Flows
To Developing Countries, 1980 - 1993
US$
billion

US$

US$

billion

Vo

Vo

billion

0k

Aggregate net resource flow

90.3

100.0

84.5

100.0

2t3.2

100.0

Off icial Development

35.2

39.0

42.6

50.4

53.9

25.3

Official grant

13.3

14.7

19.2

22.7

30.1

t4.1

Official loans (net)

2t.9

24.3

23.4

27.7

23.8

tt.2

Bilateral

14.1

t5.7

11.6

t3.7

9,3

4.4

7.8

8.5

11.8

14.0

14.5

5.8

Total private flows

55.1

61.0

41.9

49.6

1.59.2

74.7

Private debt flows (net)

49.8

55.1

t2.7

15.0

45.7

2t.4

Commercial Banks

33.9

37.5

0.8

0.9

-2.2

-1.0

Bonds

2.6

2.9

5.3

6.3

42.r

19.8

Others

13.3

14.7

6.6

7.8

5.8

2.7

Foreign direct investment

5.3

5.9

25.7

30.4

66.6

31.2

Portfolio equity inveshnent

0.0

0.0

3.5

4.1

46.9

22.0

f

inance

Multilateral

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994-95, Vol. I

l8

1993

1989

1980
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Table 2
Net Private Capital Flows
By Region, 198O - 1993
1980
US$
billion

EDTlGNP
o/o

1993

1989
a
olo

d

EDTIGNP

US$
billion

olo

o/t

a

US$
billion

EDTIGNP
oto

ol,

b

Total Private capital

t57 2

100.0

28.9

63.1

40.1

31.7

23.9

18.4

290

18.5

36.7

2.1

5.6

49,9

58.0

36.9

36.8

19.1

5.2

13.8

44?

2.0

1.3

56.8

2.4

17.3

3.5

9.3

33.4

5.7

3.6

43.3

14.3

30.7

3.4

9.0

72.2

-06

-0.4

73.2

37 .7

100.0

34.6

14.5

384

24.1

26.7

9.0

24.8

45.0

36.1

-1.1

-2.0

South Asia

1.3

Sub-Saharan Africa

7.9

55.1

100.0

8.9

16.2

Europe & Central Asia

13.3

Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa

East Asra

&

Pacific

a.

EDTIGNP (%) is total external debt as a percent of gross national product

b.

Total private capital includes private debt flows (net), foreign direct investment and portfolio equrty fl<;ws

l9
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ON THE ISSTJE OF UNTVERSAL BAI\IKING

IN THE NIGERIAI\I CONTEXT
Contd. Jrom page 7O
that it should be mere change for
the sake of change, the quest for
novelty, without a proper appreciation of its ramifications. Nor
should it be a matter of concession here and there in a disjointed
patchwork of balancing acts
aimed at achieving a level playing field and competitive equity!
In conclusion, I am per-

suaded, after reviewing the
20

available literature and the prevailing local industry situation,
that the realissue for now is not
universal banking. Certainly universal banking cannot dealwith
the inefficiencies and distortions
in the system nor will it make a
distressed merchant bank viable.

I,

therefore. commend the
pragmatic solution whose main
elements I had earlier outlined.

The views expressed here are
personaland should not be taken
as coinciding with those of the
CBN. I should stress that the
CBN has not yet taken any decision to introduce universalbanking.
My comments are merely intended to provoke a lively debate

on the subject under the

ar-rs-

pices of the Bankers' Committee.

